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Note
A Square Meaning for a Round Phrase: Applying the
Career Offender Provision's "Crime of Violence"
to the Diminished Capacity Provision of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
John A. Henderson
Carolyn Kay Poff believed her deceased father, who sexually
abused her for years,1 directed her from beyond the grave to
write threatening letters to public figures.2 In 1989, Ms. Poff
was convicted for writing threatening letters to President Ron-
ald Reagan3 and sentenced to fifty-one months imprisonment.4
The trial court concluded Ms. Poff's crime was violent,5 render-
ing her ineligible for a downward sentencing departure under
the diminished capacity provision of the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines ("Guidelines"),6 and imposed the minimum sen-
1. United States v. Poff, 723 F. Supp. 79, 83 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 926
F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991). Ms. Poff had
psychological problems for years, resulting in several stays in psychiatric insti-
tutions. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
2. Poff, 723 F. Supp. at 83. Poff had been convicted of making two bomb
threats, first in 1970 and again in 1973, and threatening a county prosecutor in
1978. Id. at 81. Her federal probation was revoked in 1979 for writing several
threatening letters to President Jimmy Carter. Id. These prior convictions ren-
dered her eligible for an upward departure under the career offender provision.
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1994)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; see infra notes 47-57 (discussing the Guidelines' defini-
tion of a career offender); see also infra notes 74, 81-83 (describing the use of
Poffs career offender status by both the majority and dissent in Poff).
3. Ms. Poff was convicted of six counts of threatening the life of the Presi-
dent under 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1988). Poff, 723 F. Supp. at 82-83.
4. Id. at 85.
5. The trial court stated, "The offense of threatening the life of the Presi-
dent is a crime of violence within the meaning of the [career offender provision
of the Sentencing Guidelines]." Id. at 84. The court reasoned that this ren-
dered the crime violent under the diminished capacity provision, which allows
courts to reduce an offender's sentence in certain cases. Id.
6. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13; see infra notes 58-105 (explaining the
requirements and interpretation of the diminished capacity provision). The
Guidelines, effective 1987, have provoked substantial debate in both judicial
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tence allowed under the presumptive range.7 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court." Although all
interested parties agreed that Ms. Poff never intended to carry
out her threats, 9 the court of appeals defined violence based
solely on the elements of the substantive offense, disregarding
the actual behavior of the defendant. 10
The Guidelines' diminished capacity provision permits a
downward departure from the sentencing range only if the of-
fender11 committed a "non-violent offense."12 The majority of
courts hold that "non-violent offense" means the opposite of the
term "crime of violence" in the Guidelines' career offender provi-
and academic circles. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake
of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE
L.J. 1681, 1687-1726 (1992) (criticizing the Guidelines as unworkable because
of inappropriate policy decisions); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines
Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRim. L. REv. 161, 185-90 (1991) (ar-
guing Guidelines usurp Article I powers of judges); Gerald W. Heaney, Revi-
siting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771,
773-82 (1992) (claiming Guidelines cause more disparity and place discretion in
prosecutors' hands); Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do
They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. CRm. L. REv. 367, 370-73 (1989)
(arguing the Commission failed to adopt a consistent penal theory that renders
them unworkable); Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 413,
465-73 (1992) (claiming the Commission failed to adequately consider the pur-
poses of punishment).
Courts have debated the meaning of a number of provisions in the Guide-
lines. One strongly disputed issue is the standard of review for departures
under the residual departure clause, which permits departure for circum-
stances not adequately considered by the Commission. U.S.S.G., supra note 2,
§ 5K2.0; see infra note 46 (discussing the residual exception). Compare United
States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating the sentencing
court had "wide discretion in determining which circumstances to take into ac-
count in departing from the guidelines") with United States v. Diaz-Villafane,
874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.) (scrutinizing the reasonableness of the departure on
appeal), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).
7. Poff, 727 F. Supp. at 85.
8. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
9. In the Seventh Circuit's decision both the majority and the dissent
state that no one believed Ms. Poff posed a real danger of carrying out her
threats. Id. at 590, 593 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 592. In Ms. Poff's case, the court examined whether threatening
the life of the President included, "as an element[,] the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another." U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 4B2.2 (emphasis added); see infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text
(defining "crime of violence").
11. This Note uses the term offender, rather than defendant, because at
the sentencing stage the criminal justice system has already made a guilt
determination.
12. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
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sion.13 The definition of "crime of violence" focuses on whether
an element of the statutory offense includes violence or the
threat of violence. 14 By contrast, two circuit courts interpret
"non-violent offense" to mean the actual risk of violence posed by
the offense and the actual danger of the offender.15
The limited definition of "non-violent offense" that the ma-
jority of courts use prevents departure for an offender who mer-
its less punishment, raising substantive due process and
equitable concerns. 6 Some offenders, like Ms. Poff, are unlikely
to use violence. Yet, the majority of courts do not reduce the
sentences of these individuals.
These due process and equitable concerns take on increased
significance with trial courts' growing use of the diminished ca-
pacity departure. In 1989, courts made 699 downward depar-
tures; eight of these departures were under the diminished
capacity provision. 17 In 1992, courts made 7653 downward de-
partures; of these, 122 came under the diminished capacity pro-
vision. 18 Leaving aside departures that occur through plea
bargaining, diminished capacity accounted for almost eight per-
cent of downward departures in 1992.19
13. See id. § 4B1.2; infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text (exploring
the courts' attempts to define "non-violent offense").
14. The Guidelines' text supports this interpretation. The first clause of
the definition refers to violence or threats of violence "as an element," U.S.S.G.,
supra note 2, § 4B1.2, clearly invoking the statutory offense.
15. United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see infra notes 91-105
and accompanying text (describing the facts and reasoning of these cases).
16. The purposes of punishment-retribution, incapacitation, deterrence,
and rehabilitation-support leniency in sentencing offenders suffering from a
diminished mental capacity, who pose a minimal risk of actual violence. See
infra notes 164-176 and accompanying text (analyzing how the purposes of pun-
ishment should impact the definition of violence in the diminished capacity
provision).
17. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1989 ANNuAL REPORT 50
(1990). In 1989, the Commission provided departure statistics on 5128 cases.
Id. at 47. Diminished capacity accounted for eight of 699 (or 1.1%) of all down-
ward departures. Id.
18. In 1992 diminished capacity accounted for 122 of 7653 (1.6%) down-
ward departures. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1992 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 125 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 ANNuAL REPORT].
19. Leaving aside substantial assistance departures, U.S.S.G., supra note
2, § 5K1.1, which function as plea bargaining tools, and departures pursuant to
plea agreements, diminished capacity departures accounted for 122 of 1566 de-
partures, or nearly eight percent. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 125.
Only adequacy of criminal history, U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4A1.3, family ties,
id. § 5H1.6, and the residual exception, id. § 5K2.0, accounted for more depar-
tures. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 73.
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This Note addresses whether, under the diminished capac-
ity provision, the "violence" of an offense should depend on the
elements of the substantive offense, as in the career offender
provision. This Note argues that using the career offender pro-
vision to define "non-violent offense" in the diminished capacity
provision ignores the conflicting purposes of these provisions
and inappropriately limits the sentencing court's discretion to
tailor sentences to individual offenders. Part I enumerates the
purposes of the Guidelines and, specifically, of the diminished
capacity and career offender provisions. Part I also describes
the circuit courts' attempts to define "non-violent offense." Part
IE analyzes the text, legislative history, and purposes of the di-
minished capacity and career offender provisions. Part I ana-
lyzes both the existing Guidelines and the policies of
punishment and concludes that they support making a fact-spe-
cific inquiry to determine an offender's "violence." This Note
urges either the Supreme Court to interpret or the Commission
to amend the diminished capacity provision so that the of-
fender's actual likelihood of violence determines the definition of
a non-violent offense. Finally, this Note proposes a two-step
analysis for determining whether an offense was violent. Courts
should ask, first, whether the offender intended to use or
threaten the use of force and, second, whether the offender's ac-
tions constituted a substantial step towards the use of force.
2 0
I. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The goals of the penal system and the role of punishment in
the United States have evolved over the past two centuries.
21
20. Ms. Poff's conduct fulfills the first step of this analysis: she intended to
threaten the use of force against President Reagan. Ms. Pofis conduct does not
fulfill the second step, however, because she failed to take a substantial step
towards the use of force. See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (apply-
ing this proposed analysis to Poff).
21. Before 1870, "the primary purposes of incarceration in the United
States were retribution and punishment." ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentenc-
ing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CPiM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 883, 893 (1990) (citing United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46
(1978)). "For [utilitarian writers], the ethical merit of a punishment depended
on how well it worked to produce a balance of pleasure over pain...." JAMES
HEATH, EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PENAL THEORY 57 (1963). Fredrick Wines ar-
gued, however, that the policies of "retribution and repression" were discredited
by the beginning of the 18th century. FREDRICK H. WIsNS, PUNISHMENT AND
REFORMTION 122-23 (1919). In any case, "[i]n 1870... the rehabilitative the-
ory of prisons and punishment was brought to the forefront of the nation's at-
tention by the National Congress of Prisons." Nagel, supra, at 893; see also
1478
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Before the Guidelines were in effect, the federal courts used in-
determinate sentencing,22 and judges possessed virtually unlim-
ited discretion in sentencing offenders. 23 Scholars' criticism of
the indeterminate sentencing system increased in the 1970s. 24
Disparate sentences for offenders with similar criminal histories
WINEs, supra, at 199-207 (discussing the reformation efforts leading up to the
National Congress, and Wines's efforts to construct a prison in New York State
to accommodate rehabilitory goals); Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical
and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393,393 (1991) (restating Nagel, supra).
This rehabilitative theory remained a central sentencing consideration until
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Congress intended the Guidelines to incor-
porate deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation. See infra
notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 4205, repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, Ch. 58, §§ 218(a)(5),
235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1837, 2032 (1984). Wines, in Punishment and Reform, traced
the history of indeterminate sentencing in the early 19th century. WINES,
supra note 21, at 23-227. Wines argued that determinate sentencing either
punishes too much or too little. Id. at 221. He asserted determinate sentences
can account only for the offender at the time of sentencing and, therefore, can-
not determine when the offender may safely reenter society. Id.
23. Freed, supra note 6, at 1687 ("[J]udges received wide ranges within
which to sentence, but no anchoring point from which to begin."); Bruce M.
Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurispru-
dence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NorE DAME L. REv. 1, 1
(1991) (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)).
The breadth of judges' discretion virtually eliminated the appeal process
from criminal sentencing. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's imposition of the death penalty over
the jury's unanimous recommendation of life imprisonment. Id. at 252. The
Court held the sentencing court's use of evidence "obtained outside the court-
room from persons whom a defendant has not been permitted to confront or
cross examine," id. at 245, did not violate due process. Id. at 252. In addition to
such broad discretion, in the pre-Guidelines era the sentencing court had no
obligation to enumerate reasons for a particular disposition. Marc Miller, True
Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 587, 602 (1992); Wil-
liam W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an Appropri-
ate Balance, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 571, 571 (1992).
Despite this broad discretion, the possibility of parole removed much of a
judge's control over the period of incarceration and the offender seldom served
the entire imposed sentence. Karle & Sager, supra note 21, at 414. After an
offender served one-third of the imposed sentence, the parole board took control
of the determination of the actual period of incarceration, or "real time." 18
U.S.C. § 4163, repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 58, § 218(a)(4)-(5), 98 Stat.
1837, 2027 (1984).
24. See, e.g., MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 88 (1973) (claiming
indeterminate sentencing causes more "cruelty and injustice" than good); Leo-
nard Cargan & Mary A. Coates, The Indeterminate Sentence and Judicial Bias,
20 CRIME & DELINQ. 144, 147-56 (1974) (reporting the results of a study and
concluding indeterminate sentencing failed to eliminate bias in sentencing);
Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the
Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 303-04 (1974) (arguing indeterminate sentencing
involves a lack of proportionality).
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who committed similar crimes drew the strongest criticism.25
Congress responded to this criticism 26 by creating the United
States Sentencing Commission (the Commission).27
In its charge to the Commission, Congress rejected basing
sentencing on retribution alone.28 It mandated that the Com-
mission ground any sentencing reform in retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 29 and required the
25. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, § 217(a),
98 Stat. 1837, 2018 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)) ("The purposes of the
United States Sentencing Commission are to... provide certainty and fairness
in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct....") (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 ("Federal judges
mete out an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar his-
tories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances.");
Nagel, supra note 21, at 895-99 (examining various scholarly and empirical
criticisms of indeterminate sentencing).
Indications that status characteristics, such as race, gender, religion, and
education, influenced the offender's sentence particularly troubled many
commentators. See id. at 895; Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-
5 (1988) (discussing the evidence of disparity before Congress while deliberat-
ing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). Congress's other major concern was
creating "certainty" in sentencing, rather than allowing a parole board to cut
short the sentences of some offenders. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)); S. REP. No.
225, supra note 25, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A-N. at 3221.
26. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 25, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.CA.N. at
3221.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 993(a).
28. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 stated:
It has been suggested that one aspect of this purpose of sentencing,
"just deserts," should be the sole purpose of sentencing.... While the
Committee obviously believes that a sentence should be just[f]; and
that the punitive purpose is important, it also believes that it is consis-
tent with that purpose to examine the other purposes of sentencing set
forth in section 3553(a)(2) [of Title 18] in determining the type and
length of sentence to be imposed in a particular case.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 25, at 75 n.162, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.N. at
3258 n.162.
29. "The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to...
assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code...." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). Section 3553
states that a court, in sentencing, shall consider:
[T]he need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner ....
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Commission to create guidelines implementing these policies.30
The Commission responded to this mandate by creating a sen-
tencing scheme centered around a 258-box grid called the "Sen-
tencing Table."3 1 Each box contains a presumptive sentencing
range the Commission considered "a 'heartland,' a set of typical
cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes."3 2
A. BALANCING BETWEEN CHARGE AND REAL OFFENSE
SENTENCING: AN ATTEMPT TO STRADDLE UNWORKABLE
EXREMis
In creating the Guidelines, the Commission attempted to re-
flect the strengths of both the charge offense- and real offense-
based systems.3 3 A charge offense system imposes punishment
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988). These four sub-sections correspond, respectively,
to retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See S. Rep. No.
225, supra note 25, at 75-76, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3258-59 (dis-
cussing the need for sentencing to reflect retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
31. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5A. The grid contains 43 "Offense Levels" and
six "Criminal History Categories." Id. Each substantive crime under federal
law has a "base offense level," demarking the relative severity of the offense.
See id. § 2, 1A4(h). Chapter two of the Guidelines provides a base offense level
for each statutory crime followed by "specific offense characteristics," which are
crime specific factors that may warrant an increase in the offense level. The
criminal history category depends on the offender's prior sentences (including
their length), id. § 4A1.l(a)-(c), whether the current offense was committed
"while under any criminal justice sentence," id. § 4A1.l(d), the period of time
between the current offense and the most recent prior offense, id. § 4A1.1(e),
and whether the offender's prior crimes were "crimes of violence." Id.
§ 4A1.l(f). For each combination of offense level and criminal history category
the Commission determined a sentencing range. Id. § 5A. For a clear example
of a calculation of the presumptive range for a hypothetical bank robber, see
John F. Jackson, Departure from the Guidelines: The Frolic and Detour of the
Circuits - How the Circuit Courts are Undermining the Purposes of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Dic- L. REv. 605, 607-09 (1990).
For a discussion of the policies the sentencing grid implicates, see Miller,
supra note 23, at 590-604. Miller argues that the complexity of the grid ob-
scures the policies responsible for particular choices. Id. at 604. Miller con-
cludes that the Guidelines' complexity engenders disrespect and distrust. Id. at
605.
32. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 1A4(b). If a court sentences an offender
within this sentencing range, an appellate court should only "review the sen-
tence to determine whether the guidelines were correctly applied." Id. § 1A2.
In other words, the sentencing judge has virtually unlimited discretion to sen-
tence within the range established by the Commission.
33. The Commission believed one of the most important issues it faced was
whether real offense or charge offense sentencing served its mandate. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 2, § 1A4(a). After exploring a pure real offense system and finding it
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based on the substantive statutory offense of the conviction. 3 4
The charge offense paradigm disregards any harms or mitigat-
ing circumstances not accounted for in the elements of the statu-
tory offense. 35 By contrast, the real offense system focuses on
the behavior of the offender.3 6 This paradigm attempts to
achieve proportionality to the offender's culpability, measured
by the offender's actual conduct.37 In its pure form, the real of-
fense system considers any behavior that increases or reduces
the likelihood of future criminal behavior. 38
unworkable, the Commission moved to a largely charge-based system that in-
corporated a number of real offense elements. Id.
34. At least one commentator criticizes this term as a misnomer because
the court will sentence the offender based on the offense of conviction, not the
offense charged. David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sen-
tencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 Mw-N. L. REv. 403, 406 n.8
(1993).
35. Yellen refers to systems that consider some factors other than the of-
fense of conviction, such as the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines' consideration
of the defendant's criminal history, as "modified charge offense" systems. Yel-
len, supra note 34, at 407 n.10. In its pure form, charge offense sentencing
would not reflect an offender's criminal history unless it constituted part of the
offense, such as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. While incorporat-
ing these factors means the system is not a pure charge offense system, it still
follows the basic principle of charge offense systems: the statutory offense con-
trols the sentence, not the actual conduct of the offender. See Breyer, supra
note 25, at 9 ("Such a system would tie punishments directly to the offense for
which the defendant was convicted.") (footnotes omitted); Selya & Kipp, supra
note 23, at 10 ("Reminiscent of a 'charge offense' system, a key determinant of
the defendant's ultimate sentence ... is tied to the charged offense.").
36. Breyer, supra note 25, at 10.
37. No real agreement exists on an exact definition of real offense. Kevin
R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 526 n.15 (1993). Broadly defined, a real offense characteristic is any
factor not included in the definition of the offense. Yellen, supra note 34, at 408;
see also Selya & Kipp, supra note 23, at 9 (stating that a real offense system
"would calibrate a defendant's sentence on the basis of all identifiable conduct
... [and] insures greater proportionality in sentencing").
38. Part of Reitz's "working definition" of real offense sentencing includes
"[a]ll behaviors of the offender, including all harms ever caused by the of-
fender." Reitz, supra note 37, at 527. Although Reitz acknowledges that this
definition is expansive, it does describe the paradigm real offense system. Id.
This paradigm clearly influenced the definition of "relevant conduct" in the
Guidelines. Section 1B1.3 defines relevant conduct as "all acts ... that occurred
during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that of-
fense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
offense. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 1B1.3(a)(1). Wbile this definition does not
encompass all conduct by the defendant, it considers factors well beyond the
charged offense.
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Neither paradigm works as the sole basis of sentencing. 39 A
pure charge offense-based system fails to consider whether an
offender's conduct presented a harm or deserves leniency for a
reason the statute has not contemplated.40 On the other hand,
scholars criticize real offense systems for considering "inappro-
priate" factors, such as alleged offenses for which the defendant
was never charged or for which the defendant was acquitted.41
A pure real offense-based system also must account for so many
factors that it becomes impossible to apply efficiently. 42 There-
fore, the factors the Commission deemed relevant in sentencing
(and the weight assigned to these factors) reflect a compromise
between a charge offense system and a real offense system.
Many scholars and judges nevertheless criticize the balance the
Commission struck as improper and unworkable.43
B. DEPARTURE UNDER THE GUIDELiNEs: INCORPORATING REAL
OFFENSE Poucn s IN SENTENCING
Because of the Commission's consideration of real offense
concerns, the Guidelines permit upward or downward depar-
39. Breyer, supra note 25, at 8-12. Breyer asserts that "tihe first inevita-
ble compromise which faced the Commission concerned the competing ratio-
nales behind a 'real offense' sentencing system and a 'charge offense' system. It
is a compromise forced in part by a conflict inherent in the criminal justice sys-
tem itself: the conflict between procedural and substantive justice." Id. at 8-9
(footnote omitted); see also Selya & Kipp, supra note 23, at 9-11 (discussing the
Commission's effort to combine charge offense and real offense paradigms and
policies served).
40. A particular statutory offense cannot account for all harms that an of-
fender may inflict in the course of the particular offense. Although the bank
robber who simply holds up a pistol has committed the same offense in a charge
offense system as one who repeatedly points it at customers and cocks the ham-
mer, we consider the second offender more culpable. See Breyer, supra note 25,
at 9.
41. Selya & Kipp, supra note 23, at 9. In pure form, the real offense system
considers the offender's entire life and circumstances. Yellen, supra note 34, at
408.
42. See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 37, at 542-47 (arguing the United States
Supreme Court too readily accepts real offense sentencing); Michael H. Tonry,
Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 J.
CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1566-67 (1981) (arguing that the Model Sentenc-
ing Act violates the "most rudimentary due process" requirements by consider-
ing uncharged conduct related to the offense).
43. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 901, 908-15 (1991) (arguing that
the Guidelines focus too heavily on harms rather than people); Freed, supra
note 6, at 1708 (arguing that the policies the Commission followed lead to an
inappropriate loss of discretion in sentencing). But see Selya & Kipp, supra
note 23, at 10 ("This hybrid approach is both workable and equitable.").
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tures from the presumptive range when circumstances war-
rant." The departure provisions allow the sentencing court to
tailor the sentence to fit an individual offender.45 The Guide-
lines enumerate specific circumstances warranting departure,
and include a residual or "catch all" exception. 46
44. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, §§ 5H, 5K. Section 5H enumerates specific
characteristics of the offender relevant in sentencing. Id. § 5H. Section 5K pro-
vides specific circumstances surrounding the offense that warrant departure.
Id. § 5K. The Commission, however, excluded many offender characteristics as
not normally relevant or irrelevant in sentencing. The Commission determined
characteristics such as the age, education, and mental and emotional condition
of the offender are not ordinarily relevant in sentencing. Id. § 5H1. The Guide-
lines explicitly state that status characteristics such as race, gender, and reli-
gion are irrelevant in sentencing. Id. § 5H1.10. Because the Commission
incorporated those factors relied on most often for pre-Guideline sentencing in
determining the Guidelines' presumptive range, it believed that courts would
not depart often. Id. § 1A4(b). The Commission used empirical studies of ex-
isting sentencing practices to formulate ranges and specific offense characteris-
tics, but deviated in several instances for specific policy reasons. See, e.g., id.
§ 1A3. The percentage of cases in which the court departed from the presump-
tive range, however, has increased each year, with the courts departing in
22.6% of the cases in 1992. 1992 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 18, at 121.
45. The Commission provided a number of specific situations that may
warrant upward or downward departure. The grounds for upward departure
include conduct such as the use of a weapon or dangerous instrumentality not
included in the statutory offense, U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.6 (increasing
sentence proportionally to dangerousness of weapon, manner used, and extent
endangered others), or unusually heinous conduct by the offender. Id. § 5K2.8
(including torture of victim and gratuitous infliction of injury). The Commis-
sion provided downward departures for circumstances including the offender's
substantial assistance to the authorities. Id. § 5K1.1. This provision permits
departure only "[ulpon motion of the government." Id.
Prosecutorial discretion controls the decision to move for departure under
section 5K1.1. Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 (1992) (holding
prosecutor's refusal to move for departure reviewable only if based on unconsti-
tutional motivations). For a critique of how the substantial cooperation provi-
sion impacts plea bargaining, see Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion
To Bring a Substantial Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: En-
forcing a Good Faith Standard, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1272-83 (1994). The
Commission also provided downward departures for circumstances such as sig-
nificant provocation by the victim, U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.10 (authorizing
a decrease if wrongfully provoked), or the offender's significantly diminished
capacity. Id. § 5K2.13.
46. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.0. The residual departure authorizes de-
parture when "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com-
mission." Id. Determining the bounds of a court's discretion under this general
exception has precipitated much litigation and scholarly debate. See, e.g., Judy
Clarke & Gerald McFadden, Departures from the Guideline Range: Have We
Missed the Boat, or Has the Ship Sunk?, 29 AM. CRim. L. REv. 919, 921-26
(1992) (arguing that courts have interpreted the departure provisions too nar-
rowly); Selya & Kipp, supra note 23, at 18-27 (identifying several trends in de-
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1. The Career Offender Provision: An Upward Departure
The Guidelines permit a significant sentencing increase if
the offender is a "career offender," as defined under section
4B1.1. 4 7 The Guidelines increase an offender's sentence
if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the
instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense. 4 8
The Commission framed this section to comply with 28
U.S.C. § 994(h), which mandated that certain career offenders
receive "a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the
maximum term authorized."49 Congress targeted these offend-
ers because they demonstrate repeated refusals to conform to so-
cietal norms and, statistically, will continue to commit
offenses.5 0 Although some believe that incarcerating these indi-
viduals for long periods of time may not effectively address the
problem of career criminals, 5 1 Congress unequivocally man-
dated that these offenders receive harsh treatment.
parture under § 5K2.0); Owen S. Walker, Litigation-Enmeshed Sentencing:
How the Guidelines Have Changed the Practice of Federal Criminal Law, 25
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 639, 646 (1992) (arguing that departure provisions have led
to more complicated litigation over sentencing).
47. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.1.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (listing criteria for offenders Congress determined
merited longer sentences).
50. A seminal study tracked the delinquency of all males born in 1945 in
Philadelphia. MARVrN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 5
(1972). Of all offenses committed by this group, 84.2% were committed by recid-
ivists, who constituted 53.6% of all delinquents. Id. at 88. More significantly,
18% of the delinquent population in the cohort committed five or more offenses
and accounted for 51.9% of the delinquent acts of the cohort. Id.; see also Kms-
TEN M. WnLLIAMs, THE SCOPE AND PREDICTION OF RECImSM H, at 10 (1978)
(finding that seven percent of offenders having at least four arrests in a four
year period accounted for 24% of all arrests in a 56-month period in Washing-
ton, D.C.); David F. Greenberg, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment:
Some Estimates, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 541, 550 (1975) (stating that of all males
paroled in 1969, 27% were incarcerated again in two years); Shlomo Shinnar &
Reuel Shinnar, The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of
Crime: A Quantitative Approach, 9 LAw & Soc'Y Ruv. 581, 594 (1975) (finding
37.3% of individuals arrested in New York had three or more previous charges).
51. See, e.g., DANIEL GLAsEa, THE EFFECTIvENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE
SYSTEM 36-37 (1964); Gray Cavender & Michael C. Musheno, The Adoption and
Implementation of Determinate-Based Sanctioning Policies: A Critical Perspec-
tive, 17 GA. L. REv. 425, 446-58 (1983) (arguing determinate sentencing func-
tions more as a symbolic action than an effective reform); Daniel Katkin,
Habitual Offender Laws:A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 99, 106-08 (1972);
George C. Thomas I & David Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative Crime
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Courts interpret the career offender provision consistently.
The Guidelines explicitly define "crime of violence," under the
career offender provision, as any offense punishable by impris-
onment for greater than one year that
(i) has as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(ii) ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury to another.52
Thus, the Commission used a charge offense definition, based on
the elements of the crime the offender committed, to address the
real offense concern with the offender's recidivism. 53 By focus-
ing on the statutory or abstract risk of violence, the Commis-
sion's definition arguably encompasses the largest group of
offenders.
If the offender's conduct included violent actions, the statu-
tory offense most likely incorporates it as an element. By focus-
ing on the statutory offense, both violent offenders and offenders
who risked violence fall within the provision's definition. If an
offender's conduct posed a risk of violence, regardless of whether
it materialized, the career offender provision will apply. In addi-
tion, the Application Notes to the career offender provision out-
line examples of offenses constituting crimes of violence,
including murder, forcible sex offenses, robbery, and extortion.
54
Control Theology, 63 NomE DAME L. REv. 123 (1988) (studying violent crime in
Tennessee and concluding legislative attempts to increase punishment to re-
duce the crime rate are ineffectual).
52. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.2 (emphasis added). The career offender
provision initially defined "crime of violence" by referencing 18 U.S.C. § 16,
which differed from the current definition only by including force against the
"property of another" within the meaning of"crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 16
(1987). This presented the bizarre possibility noted by one commentator that
tipping over garbage cans constituted a crime of violence. Albert W. Alschuler,
Departure and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D.
459, 464 (1988). The Commission deleted the cross reference to Title 18 in
1989, and included an almost identical definition, except it removed offense
against property from the definition. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUmELnS MANUAL § 4B1.2 (1989).
53. For comparison, the definition of "relevant conduct" under the Guide-
lines includes acts occurring "during the offense of conviction, in preparation for
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility
for that offense. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 1B1.3(a)(1). This provision considers
the actions of the offender, apart from actions included in the charged crime.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (10th Cir.
1994) (escape from jail); United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir.)
(kidnapping), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 612 (1994); United States v. Dailey, 24
F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 1994) (interstate travel with intent to carry on the
unlawful activity of extortion); United States v. Payton, 28 F.3d 17, 19 (4th Cir.)
(involuntary manslaughter), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 452 (1994); United States v.
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In addition, courts have determined that numerous offenses con-
stitute crimes of violence.55
Furthermore, when the elements of the statutory offense in-
clude the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,
most courts hold that sentencing courts may not consider the
offender's actual conduct.56 If the elements of the statutory of-
fense do not involve force, the Application Notes state that sub-
section (ii) of the "crime of violence" definition, referring to the
offender's conduct, permits conduct specifically included in the
indictment to qualify the offense as a "crime of violence." 57 The
inclusion of this conduct deviates somewhat from the charge of-
fense paradigm, but the definition of "crime of violence" remains
firmly rooted in the charge offense scheme.
2. Downward Departure Under the Diminished Capacity
Provision
By contrast to the career offender provision, the diminished
capacity provision (notwithstanding the undefined "non-violent
offense") plainly uses a real offense examination of the offender's
mental capacity.58 Although the Guidelines provide that mental
Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994) (aiding and abetting arson, conspiracy to
commit arson); United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (extor-
tion); United States v. Carpenter, 11 F.3d 788, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1993) (conspir-
acy to commit second-degree burglary, attempted breaking and entering of a
dwelling), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1570 (1994); United States v. Weinert, 1 F.3d
889, 891 (9th Cir. 1993) (shooting at an inhabited building); United States v.
Lonczak 993 F.2d 180, 182 (9th Cir. 1993) (child-stealing); United States v.
Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (statutory rape); United
States v. DeJesus 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (larceny from the person);
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 548 (11th Cir. 1990) (robbery),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991); United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647,
649 (8th Cir. 1990) (mailing threatening communication).
55. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.2 application note 2.
56. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d at 548 (rejecting the defendant's argument
that his prior offenses were not "crimes of violence" without considering
whether his robbery and burglary convictions involved actual violent conduct).
Contra United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
that the sentencing court retains discretion to determine whether actual vio-
lence occurred in the offender's conduct, although the statutory crime requires
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089
(1990).
57. The text of the career offender provision supports this interpretation.
U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.2. The Commission limited the examination of
the violence the offender committed by the phrase "expressly charged." Id.
58. See infra notes 161-166 and accompanying text (asserting that the re-
quirements of the diminished capacity provision contemplate the actual offense
and offender).
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conditions normally should not affect sentencing,5 9 the Commis-
sion allowed the offender's impaired mental condition to trigger
a downward departure in certain circumstances. 60 The dimin-
ished capacity provision provides that:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from
significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use
of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to
reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the
commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal his-
tory does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.
6 1
Courts consider a variety of mental disorders sufficient to
qualify an offender for reduced mental capacity.62 Despite the
courts' recognition of such mental disorders, the Guidelines dis-
qualify offenders whose diminished capacity results solely from
voluntary use of intoxicants.63 A court may depart, however,
59. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5H1.3. The Commission explicitly stated that
mental and emotional conditions ordinarily should not merit sentencing outside
the guideline range, except as provided in § 5K2. Id.
60. Id. § 5K2.13.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Diminished capacity encompasses impairments of both intellect and
emotional stability. United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Treating emotional illnesses in the same way that we do mental abnormalities
furthers the purpose of § 5K2.13."). Courts implicitly recognize that distin-
guishing between "organic syndromes" and "emotional disorders" is artificial
and contrary to modern psychological research and understanding. Id. In
Cantu, the court held that post-traumatic stress disorder may constitute a "re-
duced mental capacity." Id. at 1513. In United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95
(8th Cir. 1990), the court determined a schizoaffective disorder constituted a
diminished mental capacity. Id. at 97. The offender functioned at a 12-year-old
level at the age of 21. Id. United States v. McMurray, 833 F. Supp. 1454 (D.
Neb. 1993), aff'd, 34 F.3d 1405 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1164
(1995), determined that a manic depressive disorder satisfied the diminished
capacity provision. Id. at 1483. United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp 861
(D.D.C. 1989), held a schizophreniform disorder constituted diminished capac-
ity. Id. at 867. A jury's rejection of a defendant's insanity defense does not
constrain the sentencing court's discretion to depart if it concludes that the of-
fender's mental capacity was significantly reduced. United States v. Spedalieri,
910 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990).
63. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13. If the offender's reduced capacity was
caused in part by the voluntary use of intoxicants, the sentencing court may
depart. Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1514; Speight, 726 F. Supp at 868 ("Consequently,
that defendant's mental illness and drug addiction may both have contributed
to the commission of the offense does not bar application of 5K2.13 ... ."). This
reflects both that mental or emotional ailments frequently are multi-causal and
that these ailments may cause an individual to use intoxicants. See Cantu, 12
F.3d at 1514-15; Speight, 726 F. Supp. at 868 (diminished capacity need not be
a "but-for" cause of offense).
In Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), however, the Supreme Court
discussed whether alcoholism constituted "willfil misconduct" under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. The Court determined that a veteran's drinking consti-
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only to the extent that the offender's diminished capacity con-
tributed to the offense. 64 Finally, the provision applies only to
offenses that are "non-violent."65
Attempting to define "non-violent offense" under the dimin-
ished capacity provision has precipitated an arduous debate on
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals66 and a disagreement
among the circuits. 67 Surprisingly, the Guidelines do not define
or provide examples of a non-violent offense. 68 Early cases re-
solved this issue by concluding, with little discussion, that "non-
violent offense" must be the opposite of "crime of violence" as
defined in the career offender provision. 69 Such a conclusion
tuted "willful misconduct7 under the Act, unless it resulted from a mental
illness. Id. at 551.
64. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13. This language limits the extent to
which a court may depart but expands the circumstances to which the section
applies. The text plainly mandates that courts limit the departure based on the
strength of its causal connection. To accomplish this, the sentencing court must
determine the extent to which the offender's reduced mental capacity influ-
enced the offender's behavior. Id. Accordingly, one circuit court held that the
sentencing court committed reversible error by failing to determine whether the
offender's diminished capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.
United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court fur-
ther that if the trial court finds grounds for departure, it must specifly the "rea-
sons for the extent of its departure." Id.
This limitation expands the class of cases warranting departure because
the offender's diminished capacity need not be the sole cause of the offense. By
allowing a range of diminution, the Commission implicitly contemplated depar-
ture when the offender's diminished capacity "comprised a contributing factor
in the commission of the offense." United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95, 98
(8th Cir. 1990).
The Guidelines do not limit the extent to which a sentencing court may
depart from the presumptive range. The first draft of the diminished capacity
provision limited departure to four offense levels. UNrrED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, REVISED DRAFT SENTENCING GUIDELINES § Y218 (1987). The effec-
tive version of the Guidelines contained no limitation on the number of levels to
which a court could depart. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS § 5K2.13 (1987).
65. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
66. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (enbanc), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 827 (1991).
67. Compare United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that robbery is a crime of violence regardless of whether offender in-
tended to carry out or was capable of carrying out threats), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 953 (1991), and United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir.
1989) (using "crime of violence" to define "non-violent offense"), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 882 (1991) with United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (holding that a robbery could constitute a "non-violent offense").
68. See U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13; Poff, 926 F.2d at 589; United
States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1990).
69. United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1991); Borrayo, 898
F.2d at 94; Russell, 917 F.2d at 515; Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 819. The Ninth
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precludes a diminished capacity departure for any offender who
commits a crime requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against another, regardless of the actual
likelihood of violence.70
a. The Seventh Circuit Approach: "Non-Violent Offense"
Means the Opposite of "Crime of Violence"
In United States v. Poff,71 the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals applied the above analysis when it defined "non-violent of-
fense" as the opposite of "crime of violence." 72 Ms. Poff was
convicted for writing threatening letters to President Reagan. 78
Because she had committed several earlier offenses, Ms. Poff
qualified for an upward departure under the career offender pro-
vision. 74 There was no evidence, however, that Ms. Poff in-
tended to carry out her threats.75 Ms. Poff suffered from a
mental disorder causally linked to her commission of the of-
fenses, possibly qualifying her for a downward departure under
the diminished capacity provision. 76 Evidence demonstrated
that Ms. Poff's mental illness was likely controllable.77
The majority reasoned that, reading the Guidelines as a
whole,78 the "intentional" use of the term "violence" in both the
Circuit, in Borrayo, simply stated because the Commission did not include a
definition of "non-violent offense," the court would apply the definition of "crime
of violence" as its opposite. Borrayo, 898 F.2d at 94. Similarly, the 11th Cir-
cuit, in Russell, used the definition of "crime of violence" in constructing a nar-
row definition of "non-violent offense." Russell, 917 F.2d at 517. For a
discussion of the meaning of the term "crime of violence," see supra notes 52-57
and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text (discussing the applica-
tion of the abstract definition of "crime of violence" to the diminished capacity
provision).
71. 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
72. Id. at 591.
73. Id. at 590. Ms. Poff was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 871.
74. Id. at 590; id. at 593 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
75. Courts had previously found Ms. Poff guilty of making two bomb
threats, of threatening a county prosecutor, and of arson for setting fire to a
hotel room. Id. at 590.
76. Ms. Poff's father sexually abused her until she was 20. Id. at 590.
This led to a mental illness that caused her to threaten public officials under
what she believed was the direction of her dead father. Id.
77. Her post-trial psychiatric evaluation described her as "undergoing a re-
current major depression." United States v. Poff, 723 F. Supp. 79, 83 (N.D. Ind.
1989), aff'd, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991). This
report concluded that psycotropic medication could control her episodes. Id.
78. Poff, 926 F.2d at 592 ("[It will be presumed that if the same word be
used in both [provisions], and a special meaning were given it in the first act,
that it was intended it should receive the same interpretation in the latter act.")
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career offender and diminished capacity provisions indicated
that the Commission meant it to hold the same meaning in
both.79 If the Commission intended otherwise, the majority rea-
soned, it would have included a definition in the diminished ca-
pacity provision.80
In his dissent,8 ' Judge Frank Easterbrook questioned the
application of the career offender provision's definition of vio-
lence to the diminished capacity provision.8 2 The dissenters
considered Ms. Poff's qualification as a career offender coinci-
dental8 3 and concluded that if the Commission intended these
two terms as opposites, it would have included a cross refer-
ence.8 4 The dissenters also argued that the four general policies
of punishment warrant a different definition for "non-violent
offense."8 5
The dissent concluded that the policy of "just deserts" sup-
ports leniency in sentencing individuals with a diminished ca-
pacity.86 The Poff dissenters considered Ms. Poff a victim of her
father's abuse.8 7 The dissenters further stated that individuals
(quoting Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1871)) (quotation marks
omitted).
79. Poff, 926 F.2d at 591. The court noted minor grammatical differences
between the two provisions, but determined these differences did not influence
the analysis. Id.
80. Id. at 592. The majority also concluded, with cursory analysis, that Ms.
Poff's criminal history indicated "a need for incarceration to protect the public"
under § 5K2.13, and that therefore Ms. Poff was ineligible for departure under
the diminished capacity provision. 926 F.2d at 593. The court, however, based
its holding on the "violence" of Ms. Poff's offense. Id. at 593.
81. Judges Coffey, Cudahy, Manion, and Posner joined Judge Easterbrook
in dissent. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 594. Such an application would exclude first-time offenders from
the diminished capacity departure, although the career offender provision
would not apply to them.
83. Id. The dissent criticized the majority for basing its argument, in part,
on a perceived contradiction between Ms. Poff's eligibility for upward departure
under the career offender provision and her alleged availability for a downward
departure under the diminished capacity provision. Id. at 593-94.
84. Id. at 593. The Commission drafted the Guidelines with many cross
references, and has amended them to include more references. See infra notes
148-150 (discussing amendments referencing the definition of "crime of vio-
lence"). Easterbrook thus asserts that the Commission's failure to cross refer-
ence raises the implication that it did not consider the provisions related. Poff.,
926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
85. The dissent considered some punishment necessary, but argued that
Poff was "all bark and no bite," and therefore deserved leniency. Id. at 595.
86. Id. at 595.
87. Id. They asserted that the majority could have accepted the testimony
of Ms. Poff's expert witness that her mental illness caused her to commit these
crimes. Id.
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who have difficulty controlling their behavior warrant less pun-
ishment than "those who act maliciously or for gain,"88 and that
incapacitation should relate to the violence of the offender's con-
duct.89 Finally, the dissenters noted that punishing an offender
for criminal actions caused in part by a diminished mental ca-
pacity will not deter the offender from future crimes, because
these offenders exercise only limited control over their
behavior. 90
b. Finding that 'Non-Violent Offense" Calls for a Fact-Specific
Inquiry
By contrast, in United States v. Chatman,91 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that "non-violent offense" did
not mean the opposite of "crime of violence."92 Mr. Chatman
had pled guilty to bank robbery.9 3 Alone and unarmed, Mr.
Chatman robbed a bank by giving a threatening note to a
teller.94 The elements of bank robbery involve the use or
threatened use of force 95 and, therefore, the robbery constitutes
a "crime of violence."96
The court of appeals concluded that a fact-specific inquiry
yields the most accurate determination of the offender's danger-
88. Id.
89. Id. ("When the disturbed person's conduct is non-violent, however, in-
capacitation is less important."). The dissenters also argued that by requiring
the sentencing judge to consider the need for incarceration pursuant to
§ 5K2.13 the Commission arguably obviated the need to determine dangerous-
ness based on the statutory offense. Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting); see U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
90. 926 F.2d at 594-95. Easterbrook implies that deterrence requires of-
fenders to possess control of their behavior. Id.
91. 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
92. Id. at 1453.
93. Mr. Chatman pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Id. at 1447.
94. Id. at 1447. The note claimed there were four robbers and that they
would hurt anyone who interfered. Id. Chatman submitted a psychological
evaluation describing his diminished mental capacity. Id. at 1448. The court
does not mention Chatman's particular disability or how it manifested itself.
The court noted, however, that the district court refused to depart downward
under the diminished capacity provision because the offense was a "crime of
violence." Id. at 1448. The District Court stated that "the threatening note
itself is an act of violence, making this a crime of violence, and the downward
departure for diminished capacity is therefore inapplicable." Id. (quoting Tran-
script of Sentencing Hearing 11-12 (Oct. 28, 1991)) (quotation marks omitted).
95. The federal bank robbery offense applies to "[wihoever, by force and
violence, or by intimidation, takes... any property or money ... belonging to
... any bank." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988).
96. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1449; United States v. Jones, 932 F.2d 624,
625 (7th Cir. 1991).
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ousness for the purpose of the diminished capacity provision-.97
The court argued that the Commission intended the career of-
fender provision to deprive habitual offenders of the benefit of
the doubt by including crimes with "'an unrealized prospect of
violence'" 98 an inappropriate goal in diminished capacity
cases. 99
In United States v. Weddle,100 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals also followed the Poff dissenters. Mr. Weddle pleaded
guilty to mailing threatening communications to his wife's
lover.10 1 The district court concluded Mr. Weddle's actions re-
sulted from a "major depressive episode,"10 2 and the court de-
parted from the Guidelines under the diminished capacity
provision,10 3 even though the crime Mr. Weddle was convicted of
had, as an element, the use or threatened use of force. 10 4 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's departure, emphasiz-
ing that the disparate purposes of the two provisions warrant a
fact-specific inquiry of the offender's "violence."10 5
97. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1449. The court of appeals traced the arguments.
made in Poff by both the majority and the dissent. Id. at 1449-53. Judge Gins-
burg noted in concurrence that United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990), controlled this issue in the D.C. Cir-
cuit. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Baskin held that
the sentencing court may look beyond the elements of the statutory offense to
determine if the offense constituted a "crime of violence." 886 F.2d at 389-90.
Ginsburg stated that "non-violent offense" ought to mean the opposite of "crime
of violence," but he felt bound by precedent. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1451 (quoting United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991)).
99. The court examined the policies of the two provisions and concluded
that the policies conflicted. Id. at 1451-52. The court observed that the career
offender provision seeks to impose longer sentences on offenders who commit
repeat offenses involving the risk of violence, id. at 1451, and that the dimin-
ished capacity provision focuses on the culpability of and danger posed by the
offender. Id. at 1452.
100. 30 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 533. The prosecution charged Weddle under 18 U.S.C. § 876. Id.;
see 18 U.S.C. § 876 (criminalizing mailing threatening communications).
102. 30 F.3d at 540.
103. Id. at 537.
104. The district court concluded that Mr. Weddle's one act of violence, at-
tempting to run his wife's lover off the road and then chasing him on foot, id. at
534, did not render his threatening letters violent. Id. at 540. The court's de-
termination that Mr. Weddle's action did not demonstrate actual violence is
questionable. Mr. Weddle's actions demonstrated a reasonable possibility that
he would continue to commit violent acts.
105. Id. at 539-40. The court also explored the arguments made in Poff. Id.
at 538-39. The court concluded that the Commission intended the diminished
capacity provision to provide leniency to those who suffer from a mental disabil-
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H. A DIALECTICAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF
THE DIMINISED CAPACITY PROVISION
The Commission proposes the Guidelines, which go into ef-
fect if Congress fails to act.106 They are, therefore, a form of
statute.107 Courts and commentators currently debate the ap-
propriate form of inquiry in interpreting and analyzing legisla-
tion.'0 8 This Note adopts the interpretive model advocated by
Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey. The
Eskridge and Frickey model establishes a coherent, comprehen-
sive, and practical means of analyzing legislation.109
Eskridge and Frickey reject using a foundational approach
to statutory interpretation,"10 such as the "New Textualism" of
Justice Scalia."'1 They argue, as many other scholars argue,"12
ity, while the career offender provision focused on harshly treating the habitual
offender. Id. at 539-40; see infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text (explor-
ing the purpose of the career offender provision).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988) (providing for proposed Guidelines to become
effective at least 180 days after submission, but no later than November 1 of the
effective year).
107. They are similar, in this respect, to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which also take effect unless Congress acts to prevent it. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074 (1988).
108. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Inter-
preting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. Rav. 845, 861-74 (1992) (recognizing problems
with legislative history, but arguing against abandoning its use); Earl M.
Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Under-
enforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71
B.U. L. Rv. 767, 782-91 (1991) (arguing courts "overenforce" legislation and
apply it in contexts not desired by the legislature); Lawrence C. Marshall, The
Cannons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Constraints: A Response to
Macey and Miller, 45 VAND. L. Rv. 673, 675 (1992) (arguing judicial interpre-
tation is constrained both by judges' understanding of their role and because
they must enumerate reasons for a particular interpretation); Martin H. Redish
& Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourn-
ing the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. Rsv. 803,
870-78 (1994) (arguing in favor of textual originalism).
109. Eskridge and Frickey concisely describe their view of statutory inter-
pretation in William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990). Eskridge and Frickey ar-
gue that the United States Supreme Court, as an empirical matter, interprets
statutes by considering the factors the authors systematize in their article. Id.
at 345-62.
110. Id. at 321. The authors define foundationalism as "a theory that identi-
fies a single primary legitimate source of interpretation... and adheres to the
statutory meaning that source suggests, regardless of the circumstances or con-
sequences." Id. at 321 n.2.
111. Justice Scalia spearheaded a reevaluation of the method of statutory
interpretation on the Supreme Court. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing the
court should look to context, ordinary usage, and the surrounding body of law in
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that foundationalism cannot achieve the "objectivity" it purports
as its chief good.113 Instead of one foundational source of inter-
pretation, Eskridge and Frickey base their model on Aristotle's
notion of practical reasoning."14 They assert that "one can de-
termine what is right in specific cases, even without a universal
theory of what is right."115 This determination does not descend
into relativism because the relation between the interpreter and
the text and the norms of the interpreter's society establishes
the boundaries of viable interpretation. 116
Eskridge and Frickey advocate a dialectical inquiry using
what they have labeled the "funnel of abstraction."" v7 This
model begins with the most concrete and persuasive source-the
text of the statute. 8 This textual interpretation is aided, at the
interpreting statutes). Professor Eskridge asserts that Scalia's argument has
value, but does not support abandoning legislative history as an interpretive
tool. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1990). See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Ju-
risprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,
402-03 & n.9 (1994) (asserting Scalia's approach is a "counterrevolution" that
selectively applies interpretive techniques the Court has rejected that results in
narrowing the application of statutes).
112. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REv. 829, 849-63 (1990) (criticizing the objectivity of foundational in-
terpretive approach); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public
Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. Ruv.
707, 737-90 (1991) (same); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and
the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099, 2107-20
(1989) (same); Francis J. Mootz I, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern
World?, 68 WASH. L. Rav. 249, 280-304 (1993) (same); Michael L. Seigel, A
Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 995,
1009-32 (1994) (same); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of
Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REv. 681, 695-719 (1994) (same); Richard K. Sherwin,
Law, Violence, and Illiberal Belief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785, 1815-29 (1990) (same).
113. Eskridge and Frickey advance three basic arguments against founda-
tionalism as objective: the link between foundational analysis and majoritarian
political preferences is tenuous, foundational theories break down in hard cases
so the results are not objectively predictable, and no foundational theory can
effectively exclude evolutive considerations. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
109, at 379.
114. Id. at 323.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 382.
117. The funnel is a schematization of the various considerations in legisla-
tive interpretation. Id. at 353. The narrow base of the funnel is the least ab-
stract and most persuasive consideration-the text. Id. The farther up the
funnel one goes, the more abstract and the less weighty the factor. Id. at 353-
54.
118. The text receives great weight because the power to determine policy
resides with the enactors. Id. at 354-56 (discussing the primacy and method of
textual analysis).
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second level of abstraction, by an examination of the legislative
history of the provision.1 9 At the third level, the legislature's
purpose in enacting the statute enters the analysis.' 20 The pe-
nultimate portion of the analysis is "evolutive," exploring the so-
cial and legal circumstances the drafters did not consider.' 2 '
Finally, and most abstractly, the interpretation of a statute
should consider notions of current public policy.122 This model
accurately describes the Supreme Court's analysis of legisla-
tion123 and, by straddling the false dichotomy between founda-
tionalism and relativism, establishes a normatively sound
methodology.
A. ThXuTuAL DIsPARITIEs RENDERING THE "CmImE OF
VIOLENcE" DEFINITON INAPPROPRIATE IN THE
DIINIUSHED CAPACITY PROVISION
An analysis of the text of the diminished capacity and ca-
reer offender provisions indicates that "crime of violence" and
"non-violent offense" are not opposites. The Commission created
a term of art when it defined "crime of violence," which differs
significantly from an ordinary understanding of violence. The
Poff majority inappropriately applied this term of art in the di-
119. Eskridge and Frickey divide legislative history into specific and general
forms. Id. at 357. Specific legislative history includes reports or statements
concerning the specific issue the interpreter is addressing. For a criticism of the
use of legislative history see Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. This inquiry focuses on the statutory context and the goals of the legis-
lature. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 109, at 358.
121. Id. at 358-59. Evolutive interpretation stems primarily from problems
arising in implementation. Id. at 359. Eskridge and Frickey use United Steel-
workers of American v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), as an example of the
Supreme Court relying on evolutive concerns. The Court, Eskridge and Frickey
assert, relaxed the requirement of color-blindness under Title VII to correct for
the "ongoing effects of past discrimination." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
109, at 359.
A separate, evolutive examination of the diminished capacity and career
offender provisions provides no real insights. Unlike in Weber, where, Eskridge
and Frickey argue, the Court considered the failure of outlawing race-conscious
employment practices to remedy racial disparity in the work-place, no articul-
able policy of the Guidelines has failed. Id. The values of punishing only dis-
similar offenders differently, see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text
(asserting this was Congress's main goal in reforming sentencing), and permit-
ting departure from the presumptive range when an offender merits leniency,
see supra notes 44-46 (describing the purpose of departures), have not changed.
122. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 109, at 359. This inquiry focuses on
notions of fairness, other statutory policies, and constitutional values. Id.
123. Eskridge and Frickey discuss several cases and argue the Court consid-
ers these factors, even if not overtly. Id. at 345-62.
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minished capacity provision.124 The rule of lenity, a tool of stat-
utory interpretation, supports this conclusion.
Furthermore, the Poff majority erred in its application of
the "whole act" canon of statutory interpretation. This canon
states that a word appearing in two distinct, but related, provi-
sions should ordinarily receive the same meaning in both.125
The Poff majority ignored the significance of cross references to
the career offender provision in other sections of the Guidelines.
These cross references undermine the core of the majority's
analysis. In light of the other textual considerations, the text of
the career offender provision should not control the diminished
capacity provision.
1. The Term of Art "Crime of Violence" Differs From an
Ordinary Meaning of Violence
When interpreting a statute, courts should begin with an
ordinary meaning of the words in the provision. 12 6 As the Poff
dissent argued, the Commission created a term of art in defining
"crime of violence."1 27 This definition looks to the elements of
the statutory offense and the conduct with which the state
charged the offender. Ordinarily, "violence" refers to the of-
fender's actual violence, rather than an abstract element of a
124. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (describing the Poff ma-
jority's application of the whole act canon).
125. The "whole act" or "statutes in pari materia" canon of statutory inter-
pretation is very well established. See, e.g., Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 162, 165 (1871) ("Both acts are in pari materia, and it will be presumed
that if the same word be used in both... that it was intended it should receive
the same interpretation in the later act, in the absence of anything to show a
contrary intention.") (emphasis added) (citing DwARRIs ON STATUTES 701-66);
Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Ark. 1983) (applying the
whole act canon to the Arkansas Constitution).
126. Justice Blackmun noted that "[an interpreting court must 'begin with
the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.'" Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2609, 2625 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403,
407 (1990)) (citations omitted). Blackmun later stated that "consideration of a
treaty's ordinary meaning must be the first step in its interpretation." Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2570 n.5 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the Refugee Act of 1980 did not apply to the turning back
of Haitian refugees by the Coast Guard on the High Seas).
127. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991); see supra notes 52-57 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the specificity of the definition of "crime of violence").
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statutory charge. 128 The Commission, however, clearly man-
dated consideration of the abstract risk of violence in the career
offender provision. 29 This penalizes offenders engaged in po-
tentially dangerous conduct, without regard to the likelihood of
violence. 130
Regardless of the wisdom of using this definition in the ca-
reer offender provision,' 31 the text of the diminished capacity
provision does not mandate an abstracted definition of violence
because it fails to define "non-violent offense."' 3 2 The Commis-
sion did not indicate any intent to create a term of art when it
drafted the diminished capacity provision. Courts should, there-
fore, interpret "non-violent offense" in light of an ordinary mean-
ing of the term "violence."
2. Preventing Arbitrarily Harsh Sentences: The Rule of
Lenity
The rule of lenity essentially states that courts should
interpret criminal statutes strictly in favor of the defend-
ant.133 This rule incorporates commonly expressed apprehen-
128. See infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text (attempting to define
violence). This raises the issue of real offense versus charge offense systems.
See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (explaining the differences be-
tween, and policies underlying, charge and real offense paradigms). The other
elements of the diminished capacity provision stem from a real offense system,
while the definition of crime of violence draws primarily on charge offense no-
tions. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text (arguing these competing
policies and frameworks make it inappropriate to use the definition of "crime of
violence" as the opposite of "non-violent offense").
129. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the interpre-
tation of "crime of violence").
130. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing how the Commis-
sion's focus on the elements of the statutory offense does not consider the likeli-
hood of violence). As a result, this provision deprives the offender of the benefit
of the doubt and assumes the offender's conduct will likely result in physical
harm in the future.
131. See supra note 51 (listing articles criticizing longer incarceration as a
means of addressing career criminality).
132. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
133. "[Wlhen a choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before [choosing] the harsher al-
ternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear
and definite." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,221-
22 (1952). Some scholars argue the rule stems from concern with imposing cap-
ital punishment in ambiguous cases. PETER S. LANGAN, MAXWELL ON THE IN-
TERPRETATION OF STATUTES 238 (12th ed. 1969). Maxwell notes that many
offenses that seem petty to modern observers warranted a death sentence, such
as cutting down a cherry tree in an orchard. Id. Common law courts inter-
preted criminal statutes to avoid these harsh results.
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sions about arbitrary enforcement of penal sanctions. 134 The
penal system generally reflects a greater concern with the loss of
liberty and stigma attached to criminal sanctions than losses as-
sociated with civil sanctions.135 This greater stigma supports a
deeper inquiry into the meaning of a statutory provision before
imposing a criminal penalty.
Thus, in light of the rule of lenity, it is significant that the
Commission failed to define "non-violent offenses" in the dimin-
ished capacity provision. Such a failure demonstrates that the
Commission may not have considered what definition ought to
apply to offenders suffering from a diminished mental capac-
ity.13 6 Therefore, courts should interpret the diminished capac-
ity provision strictly against the government, to prevent an
arbitrary and unconsidered imposition of a longer sentence.
This argument carries particular weight in determining
whether the Commission intended "crime of violence" to mean
the converse of "non-violent offense." The Commission defined a
crime of violence mechanistically, by basing it on the elements of
The rule also serves several important contemporary policies. One princi-
ple derived from the rule is that the state should not punish individuals for
conduct not plainly illegal. Keppel v. Tiflin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905)
(stating the "elementary rule" that courts should not impose criminal penalties
without clear language by the drafters). Sentencing provisions only tenuously
implicate notice, as the offender violated a substantive crime. If the statute
provides "notice" of some criminal liability for the act, lack of knowledge of the
severity of the liability is unlikely to affect an offender's actions.
Sentencing provisions, however, do raise concerns with arbitrary enforce-
ment. The rule of lenity existed at English common law, LANGAN, supra, at 238,
but also reinforces policies underlying due process requirements. The Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendments stem from a desire to limit
arbitrary government action. LAURENCE H. TRmE, AmEwcAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 10-7, at 664 (2d ed. 1988). The core of the Due Process Clause also in-
cludes guarantees of an opportunity to be heard and notice. Id. § 10-15.
134. 3 JAjEz G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 59.03 (3d ed. 1943).
135. This concern manifests itself in many aspects of criminal law and pro-
cedure, perhaps most noticeably in the requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Requiring this higher standard of proof for criminal cases reflects a
desire for more certainty before the imposition of criminal penalties. We pro-
vide procedural protections not available to civil litigants in order to make the
state prove its case, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
136. The Commission focused on the congressional mandate in 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h) (1988) in drafting the career offender provision. The Commission at-
tempted to include as many repeat offenders as possible within the definition of
"crime of violence." The Commission may not have considered the impact of
these policies on the diminished capacity provision. See infra notes 164-176
and accompanying text (discussing the policies of the diminished capacity and
career offender provisions).
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the statutory offense. 137 Blindly defining these two phrases as
opposites prevents departure for dissimilar offenders. 138 Given
the language of the statute, courts should interpret the unde-
fined "non-violent offense" in favor of the defendant.
3. Application of the Whole Act Canon: The Significance of a
Failure to Cross Reference
Finally, the "whole act" canon of interpretation provides lit-
tle support for defining "crime of violence" and "non-violent of-
fense" as opposites. The failure to cross reference the two
provisions, in light of the explicit cross references in other provi-
sions of the Guidelines, arguably reveals that the Commission
intended the terms to have different meanings.
The Poff majority argued that the word "violence" should
carry the same meaning in both the career offender and dimin-
ished capacity provisions. 139 The majority's three main argu-
ments stem from application of the whole act canon. The Poff
majority correctly noted that the grammatical differences be-
tween "non-violent offense" and "crime of violence" are mini-
mal. 140 It argued that the word "violence" should, therefore,
receive the same meaning in both provisions. 14 1 The majority
also argued that the Commission made a decision that threats
were dangerous by including them in the career offender provi-
sion, and that an offender's threats of violence therefore prohib-
137. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing the definition
of "crime of violence").
138. See infra notes 197-198 (asserting that offenders who abstractly risked
violence are differently situated than those who used or risked actual violence).
The definition of "crime of violence" deprives the sentencing court of discretion.
Congress created the Commission to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sen-
tencing. See supra note 25. Congress recognized, however, that sentencing
courts must possess the discretion to treat dissimilar offenders differently by
passhig the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
139. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588,591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
827 (1991); see supra note 125 (citing cases applying the whole act canon). Es-
kridge and Frickey explain how both the majority and dissent in one of the
seminal voluntary affirmative action cases, United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), relied on the whole act canon. Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 109, at 355. The Court, they argue, was inquiring "which interpre-
tation best 'fits' into the 'whole statute'?" Id. (footnote omitted).
140. The court specifically stated that "non-violent offense" differs from
"crime of violence" only in the negative formulation and in its use of "violent" as
an adjective rather than the noun "violence" in a prepositional phrase. Poff, 926
F.2d at 591.
141. Id.
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ited leniency in the diminished capacity provision.142 This,
however, requires a determination that the Commission in-
tended a relation between the provisions, which is the funda-
mental basis of the whole act canon. Finally, the majority
argued that it was illogical to permit an upward departure for
Ms. Poff under the career offender provision and a downward
departure under the diminished capacity provision. 143 As the
dissent noted, this ignores that Ms. Poff's qualification as a ca-
reer offender was a coincidence. 144 This also presumes a rela-
tion between the provisions. Significantly, the majority noted
that offenders like Ms. Poff may merit leniency, but that the
meaning of violence was obvious.145 The majority's argument,
therefore, shatters without the whole act canon.
This application of the whole act canon has facial appeal,
but the court arguably misapplied the canon. As the Poff dissent
noted, it is significant that the Commission failed to reference
the career offender provision in the diminished capacity provi-
sion. 146 At the time Poff was decided, the Guidelines contained
two explicit cross references to the definition of "crime of vio-
lence" in other provisions. 147 The most recent version of the
Guidelines contains seven explicit references to the definition of
"crime of violence." 148 Yet, the diminished capacity provision
142. Id. at 592; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining the
career offender provision's inclusion of crimes with threats as a statutory
element).
143. Poff, 926 F.2d at 592.
144. Id. at 594; see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing
dissent's argument that interpretation of the diminished capacity provision
should not be influenced by Ms. Poff's qualification as a career offender).
145. Poff, 926 F.2d at 593. The majority felt there was "an argument in
favor of permitting downward departures for those with diminished mental ca-
pacity when the prospect that they will carry through with threats seems nil."
Id.
146. Id. at 594. For a discussion of the dissenter's argument, see supra
notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
147. The Commission added § 4B1.4 in 1990 to further increase the penalty
for armed career criminals. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.4. The Commission
noted the section used the term "violent felony," which is defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2) (1988). U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.4 application note. The Com-
mission stated that the meaning of "violent felony" differs from "crime of vio-
lence." Id. The Commission also added § 7B1.1 regarding the classification of
offenses for probation. Id. § 7BL.1. The Commission explicitly used the term
"crime of violence" and referenced the definition in the career offender provi-
sion. Id.
148. In 1991 the Commission amended the Guidelines to increase an of-
fender's Criminal History Category for committing crimes of violence, although
the offender does not qualify for departure under the career offender provision.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMUSSION, GUIDELINES m ANuAL §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2
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still contains no such cross-reference. Because the definition of
"crime of violence" is a term of art,149 explicitly cross referencing
some provisions, but not the diminished capacity provision, im-
plies the Commission did not intend a relation between the defi-
nition of "crime of violence" and "non-violent offense."150
Thus, although a strong presumption exists that a word
means the same thing in two related statutory provisions, the
Commission's explicit cross references in some provisions, but
not in the diminished capacity provision, support the opposite
conclusion. The whole act canon is, therefore, a weak basis for
the Poff majority's decision. Had the court considered other fac-
tors besides the whole act canon, it would likely have held that
(1991). The Commission referenced the definition of "crime of violence" in the
career offender provision. Id. In 1991 the Commission also amended the
Guidelines to set the base offense level of two provisions higher for offenders
with previous convictions for crimes of violence. The Commission modified the
guidelines for the Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Explosive
Materials provision, id. § 2K1.3, and the Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or
Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition provision, id. at § 2K2.1. Both
changes reference the definition of crime of violence in the career offender provi-
sion. Finally, the Commission added a potential downward departure for a con-
trolled substance offense if the base offense level over represents the offender's
culpability. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 2D1.1 application note 16. The Commis-
sion precluded departure if the offender "has one or more prior felony convic-
tions for a crime of violence." Id. The Commission referenced the definition in
the career offender provision. Id.
149. Poff, 926 F.2d at 594.
150. The Commission issues yearly amendments to the Guidelines and
clearly keeps abreast of developments in sentencing law. The Commission peri-
odically publishes a volume of Guideline decisions. E.g., UNITED STATES SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION, SELECTED GUIDELINE APPLICATION DECISIONS: JANUARY-
JuNE 1992 (1992). The Commission knew of the debate about whether "non-
violent offense" meant the opposite of "crime of violence" and failed to resolve it,
although it amended the Guidelines four times since the Poff decision. See
supra note 148.
The argument that a failure to cross reference means these provisions are
not contrapositives, however, loses impact because of the explicit distinction
made by the Commission in § 4B1.4 between "violent felony" and "crime of vio-
lence." This counter-argument essentially states that the Commission demon-
strated it would make explicit cross references to distinguish terms from "crime
of violence" and, therefore, would have also done so in the diminished capacity
provision. This counter-argument, however, is also flawed. The explicit refer-
ence distinguishing § 4B1.4 from the career offender provision occurred in 1990,
before the division on the Seventh Circuit in Poff. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, app.
C, amendment 355 (effective Nov. 1, 1990). Some courts had held "crime of
violence" meant the opposite of "non-violent offense," but without any real de-
bate. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the early cases ad-
dressing the meaning of "non-violent offense"). No serious debate drew the
diminished capacity provision to the Commission's attention. The Commission,
therefore, had no reason to consider the meaning of "non-violent offense."
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"non-violent offense" means something apart from the converse
of "crime of violence."
B. THE LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING REFORM
ACT AND THE GUIDELINES
The Congressional deliberations on the Guidelines do not
provide a specific definition of "non-violent offense." They do,
however, establish a conceptual framework that guides the in-
terpretation of the diminished capacity provision.151 While
drafting the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act and considering the
promulgated Guidelines in 1987, Congress primarily discussed
the two overarching goals of the Act: reducing disparity in sen-
tencing of similar offenders1 52 and eliminating the indefinite
time offenders served because of parole. 153 The only statements
Congress made specifically regarding departure occurred in the
discussion of the Guidelines in 1987 and concerned the residual
or "catch all" exception.1 54 Because Congress's debates fail to
provide a specific definition of "violence" for the diminished ca-
151. The concerns expressed in the Senate report flush out the policies enu-
merated in 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988). Congress
desired to eliminate the seemingly arbitrary differences in sentencing, not re-
move the sentencing court's discretion to punish each offender individually. S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 25, at 41, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N., at 3224.
152. The Senate report on the Sentencing Reform Act focuses primarily on
the problems with the parole system and disparity among similar offenders. S.
REP. No. 225 supra note 25, at 38-49, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-A.N., at 3221-
32. Congress specifically directed the Commission to avoid unwarranted dis-
parity in sentencing. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); see supra notes 28-30 and accom-
panying text (discussing Congress's mandate to the Commission). The Senate
report includes statistics regarding the disparity in the sentencing of similar
offenders, and Congress's specific concerns raised by this disparity. S. REP. No.
225 supra note 25, at 4146, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N., at 3224-29. The
statistics cited show radical differences in sentences for the same offense. Id. at
43-45, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3225-28.
These statistics may overstate the problem. They merely compare the
sentences of offenders committing the same offense; they do not isolate other
factors that appropriately contribute to different sentences, such as the crimi-
nal history and the particular harm the offender created. The pattern of dispar-
ity plainly indicates some arbitrary distinctions, such as which judge sentences
the offender, influence the sentence of many offenders. It is suspect, however,
to attribute this entirely to these arbitrary factors.
153. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 25, at 46-49, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CA.N., at 3229-32.
154. See, e.g., Sentencing Commission Guidelines: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1987) (statement of Stephen
Breyer, Judge and Sentencing Commissioner) (stating that judges will depart
for unusual circumstances not accounted for in the guidelines).
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pacity provision, it should be interpreted to further the goal of
treating dissimilar offenders differently.
At one of the Commission's hearings on the Guidelines, a
Commissioner stated that a non-violent crime could involve the
threatened use of force.155 A witness at the proceeding 56 ex-
pressed misgivings concerning the severity of punishment for
"first offenders,"157 using the example of an unarmed first time
bank robber, whom he believed usually has some mental disor-
der. 158 One of the Commissioners attempted to determine
whether the witness believed these offenders warranted proba-
tion, referring to "first offense non-violent bank robbers" who
used notes or other means to effectuate the crime.' 59 Bank rob-
bery involves the threatened use of force and, therefore, would
constitute a crime of violence under the career offender
provision.160
These statements made during the Commission's hearing
support an interpretation of "non-violent offense" that focuses on
the facts of the offense rather than an abstract definition based
on the charged conduct or the elements of the statutory of-
fense.' 6 ' A bank robber suffering from a diminished mental ca-
155. These hearings included specific topical hearings and general hearings
on the Sentencing Guidelines. The Commission held hearings on several spe-
cific issues including offense seriousness, United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Public Hearing on Offense Seriousness (Apr. 15, 1986), the use of an
offender's prior criminal record in sentencing, United States Sentencing Com-
mission, Public Hearing on the Treatment of Prior Criminal Record (May 22,
1986), and how to penalize organizations for crimes, United States Sentencing
Commission, Public Hearing on Organizational Sanctions (June 10, 1986).
156. The witness was Terence F. MacCarthy, the director of the Federal De-
fender Program in Chicago. United States Sentencing Commission, Transcript
of Proceedings Held in the Ceremonial Courtroom of the Dirksen Federal Build-
ing, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 29 (Oct. 17, 1986) [hereinafter
Ceremonial Courtroom Hearing].
157. Ceremonial Courtroom Hearing, supra note 156, at 29-32.
158. Id. at 32. MacCarthy's statement seems to refer to offenders suffering
from a mental disorder, but is somewhat ambiguous. He refers to most of these
offenders as "listening to radio stations that you and I do not hear." Id. Mac-
Carthy expressed concern that these offenders faced a five-year mandatory min-
imum sentence. Id.
159. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
160. The Commission used robbery as an example of a crime of violence.
U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4B1.2; see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text
(discussing the definition of "crime of volence).
161. The conceptual framework established by the Congressional record bol-
sters the conclusion that "crime of violence" is not the converse of "nonviolent
offense." Congress desired to reduce disparity among similar offenders. See
supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's motivations
for creating the Commission). This general goal frames the analysis and, there-
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pacity who uses threatening notes to effectuate the crime bears
a striking resemblance to the offender in United States v. Chat-
man.162 In Chatman, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that robbery could constitute a non-violent offense. 163 The
Commission's comments reveal that the Commission believed
that a von-violent offense could involve the threatened, though
improbable, use of force.
C. THE DIsPARATE PURPOSES OF THE CAREER OFFENDER AND
DnMNISHED CAPACITY PROVISIONS
The next step in the funnel of abstraction, examining the
purposes of the legislation, further supports the conclusion that
"non-violent offense" does not mean the opposite of "crime of vio-
lence."1 64 An examination of the goals or purposes of the dimin-
ished capacity and the career offender provisions reveals that
they are contradictory. The career offender provision stems
from a belief that certain offenders are statistically more dan-
gerous and warrant harsher treatment. 65 By contrast, the di-
minished capacity provision focuses on the actual danger of the
offender and contemplates leniency for a specific group of offend-
ers.1 66 These antithetical goals make it inappropriate to apply
the definition of "crime of violence" in the diminished capacity
provision.
fore, one of the key questions is whether offenders suffering from a diminished
mental capacity are different from other offenders. The Commission's inclusion
of a diminished capacity departure, as well as the policies of punishment, sup-
port concluding they are different. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying
text (arguing the policies of punishment support a fact-specific determination of
violence).
162. 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir 1993). Chatman, alone and unarmed, commit-
ted a bank robbery while suffering from a diminished mental capacity. See
supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing facts and reasoning of
Chatman).
163. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1453.
164. Professors Eskridge and Frickey note some problems with a purpose-
oriented approach, but adopt it as part of the process of contextualizing the
statute to yield a clearer understanding. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 109,
at 358. They note that many statutes were drafted to serve a number of pur-
poses that point the interpretation in different ways. Id. Eskridge and Frickey,
however, still consider it a valid interpretive tool to consider "[wihat problem
was Congress ... trying to solve, and what general goals did it set forth in
trying to solve it?" Id.
165. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (exploring the treatment
specified by Congress and the Commission's response).
166. See infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (considering the pur-
poses of punishment and arguing they support leniency for offenders suffering
from a diminished capacity).
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The career offender provision, which requires judges to sen-
tence certain repeat offenders at or near the maximum term,
emphasizes retribution and incapacitation. Through both the
use of criminal history in establishing the base offense and an
upward departure for "career offenders," 167 the Commission ex-
pressed its concern that repeat offenders are more dangerous
and more culpable than other offenders.
Given the purposes of the career offender provision, it is
hardly surprising that the definition of "crime of violence" uses
an abstract notion of violence to include both offenders who com-
mitted violent actions and those who risked using violence. 168
This definition complies with Congress's desire to impose the
maximum punishment on these offenders.169
The diminished capacity provision, by contrast, attempts to
ascertain the actual culpability of and danger demonstrated by
the offender. Apart from the "non-violent offense" requirement,
the requirements of the diminished capacity provision are pa-
tently fact specific. This focus embodies the Commission's con-
clusion that, given certain circumstances, an offender suffering
from a diminished mental capacity merits leniency. Consistent
with this policy, courts must specifically determine the extent to
which the offender's mental capacity led to the commission of
the offense when departing under this provision. 70
The exclusion of diminished mental capacity induced by vol-
untary use of intoxicants also focuses on the actual offense and
offender. 17 ' Requiring that the offender's criminal history not
167. The Commission's commentary on the criminal history section of the
Guidelines states that repeat offenders are more culpable than first time offend-
ers and merit greater punishment. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 4A. While the
Commission made no such remarks in the career offender provision, the argu-
ment applies with even greater force when the offender demonstrates a propen-
sity to commit crimes posing a risk of violence.
168. Id. § 4B1.2; see supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing
the theoretical and actual violence considerations in the career offender
provision).
169. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (examining Congress's
specific command to the Commission regarding "career offenders").
170. United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see
supra notes 62-65 (elaborating on the sentencing court's ability to depart to the
extent of an offender's diminished mental capacity).
171. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the "voluntari-
ness" of intoxication). While the offender's culpability for voluntary intoxication
may be debatable, this issue concerns the offender's actual conduct. Voluntary
intoxication generally constitutes a defense only when it negates a "specific in-
tent." See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 373 (Cal. 1969) (en banc). Alcoholism
does not render intoxication involuntary, per se. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 645
P.2d 155, 160 (Alaska 1982) (holding intoxication only involuntary if unknow-
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indicate a need for incarceration before allowing departure also
considers the actual danger posed by the offender, based on prior
criminal actions. 172 Whether an offense was "non-violent," and,
therefore, whether the offender deserves leniency, should de-
pend on the specifics of the offense and the offender.
The existing provision also allows the court to decline de-
parture when the offender's criminal history indicates incarcera-
tion is necessary to protect the public.173 The judge has
substantial discretion to determine the extent of the impact of
the offender's diminished capacity and the need for incarcera-
tion to protect the public. This residual consideration obviates
any need to incarcerate based on a risk of violence contained in
the abstract, charge offense definition of "crime of violence." The
abstract definition of "crime of violence" assumes that a risk of
violence, no matter how tenuous, 1 4 demonstrates a need for
incarceration.
The relevant issues in the diminished capacity provision are
the actual offender and offense, rather than a broad, abstract
notion of risk based on a statutory definition. Thus, using the
definition of "crime of violence" as the converse of "non-violent
offense" injects a policy contrary to the purpose of the dimin-
ished capacity provision. It inappropriately deprives the trial
court of the discretion granted under the diminished capacity
provision.
Congress considered a certain category of offenders, specifi-
cally repeat offenders, more dangerous than others.' The defi-
nition of "crime of violence," used in the diminished capacity
provision, works against the Commission's intent to permit leni-
ency when the offender is less culpable and less dangerous due
to a diminished mental capacity.176
ingly or externally compelled); State v. Palacio, 559 P.2d 804, 806 (Kan. 1977)
(accord). This stems from the notion that these offenders caused their condition
in some respects and therefore merit punishment.
172. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
incarceration).
173. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K2.13.
174. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing cases defin-
ing "crime of violence").
175. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b); see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text
(describing Congress's mandate to the Commission).
176. The use of this abstract definition leads to disturbing results forbidding
leniency for the offender who writes threatening letters with no intent to carry
out the threat or who robs a bank by using a threatening note, but poses little
danger to the public. See supra notes 71-99 and accompanying text (discussing
Poff and Chatman).
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III. A CALL TO INTERPRET OR AMEND THE
DIMINISHED CAPACITY PROVISION
Either the Supreme Court should interpret or the Commis-
sion should define "non-violent offense" in the diminished capac-
ity provision to require a fact-specific inquiry. Both the existing
provision and the policies underlying a departure for diminished
mental capacity support this definition. Thus, in determining
whether an offense was non-violent, the Commission and the
Court should determine whether the offender intended to use or
threaten the use of force and whether the offender took a sub-
stantial step towards the use of force. 177
A. PoLIcIEs OF PUNISHMENT AND THE DEFINITION OF NON-
VIOLENT OFFENSE
The policy goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribu-
tion support defining "non-violent offense" to require a fact-spe-
cific inquiry.' 78 Deterrent justifications for punishment carry
less weight for offenders with reduced mental capacities. Deter-
rence presumes the ability to control one's actions, and thus also
presumes that the offender chose, on some level, to commit the
offense. To the extent incarceration can deter criminal behav-
ior,:7 9 individuals suffering from a diminished mental capacity
warrant less punishment, because their mental capacities are
insufficient to control their acts. Because the diminished capac-
ity provision requires that the offender's capacity causally relate
177. This definition is modeled after the Model Penal Code's definition of
criminal attempt. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (deriving a rule for
violence from the definition of criminal attempt).
178. Rehabilitory concerns, the fourth major justification for punishment, do
not suggest what definition of"non-violent offense" is appropriate. Rehabilita-
tion primarily concerns the form of the offender's sentence, not the length. Re-
habilitation attempts to achieve ends similar to deterrence, preventing the
offender from committing additional offenses. JACOB ADLER, THE URGINGS OF
CONSCmNCE: A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 53 (1991). Rehabilitory punishment at-
tempts to change the offender, rather than make the penalty of crime outweigh
the benefit. Rehabilitating an offender suffering from a diminished mental ca-
pacity, when possible, requires psychological assistance.
179. No conclusive empirical data demonstrate that punishment deters
crime. JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 9 (1974). Problems
with establishing causation might be endemic to deterrence. At least one
scholar argues that the variables in empirical study of the deterrent effect of
punishment cannot be controlled to demonstrate causality. PmLip BEAN, PuN-
ismmrT 29 (1981).
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to the commission of the offense,' 8 0 punishment will have only a
limited effect on the future behavior of such offenders.' 8 '
The policies of incapacitation also support basing the mean-
ing of "non-violent offense" on a fact-specific inquiry. By isolat-
ing the offender, incapacitation essentially functions to prevent
the offender from committing more offenses against the public.
Under an incapacitation paradigm, the severity of the sentence
depends on the danger of recidivism and the severity of the po-
tential future offense.' 8 2 If the offender poses an abstract risk of
violence, but no actual risk of violence, the sentence should re-
flect this with leniency. This is especially true of offenders suf-
fering from a diminished capacity.' 83 The definition of 'crime of
violence," by contrast, assumes that if the offender threatened or
risked violence, violence was likely.' 8 4 "Violence" in the dimin-
ished capacity provision should, therefore, involve a fact-specific
inquiry.
Finally, applying notions of retribution to the diminished
capacity provision indicates "non-violent offense" should involve
a fact-specific inquiry of the offender's violence. Retribution, in a
criminal context, contemplates some level of moral blameworthi-
ness for the actions committed.'8 5 Because the offender's dimin-
ished capacity must contribute to causing the offense,'
8 6
leniency is warranted. The offender may not have made an en-
180. The offender's diminished capacity alone need not cause the offense,
but it must influence the offender's conduct significantly. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text (discussing the causal connection).
181. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1223 (asserting that deterrence will not impact insane
offenders). Punishing Ms. Poff will not effectively deter future criminality. As
her psychological evaluation found, psycotropic drugs could effectively prevent
her depressive episodes. See supra notes 76-77 (discussing Ms. Poff's mental
illness). Barring this, it is unlikely Ms. Poff will stop threatening people. It is,
therefore, inconsistent to refuse to reduce her sentence in order to "deter" her
from committing future crimes.
182. ALAN M. DERSHowrrz, BACKGROUND PAPER, reprinted in FAm AND CER-
TAIN PuNISHMENT 68, 71 (1976).
183. The diminished capacity provision precludes departure when the of-
fender's criminal history demonstrates a need to incarcerate. U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 5K2.13. This indicates the offender should receive leniency unless
proven actually dangerous.
184. See supra notes 52-53 (explaining how an abstract meaning of "vio-
lence" presumes the risk of violence).
185. John Kleinig makes a clear and insightful argument for retribution as
a basis of punishment. JoHN KLEINIG, PUNIStwMsr AND DESERT 65-92 (1973).
He addresses the notion of responsibility and how it justifies punishment. Id.
at 1-9.
186. While the offender's diminished capacity need not constitute a but for
cause, it must bear some substantial causal connection. See supra note 64.
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tirely voluntary choice to commit the offense and, therefore, may
be less blameworthy.
This is especially true when the offender poses little actual
risk of violence. Crimes involving violence generally receive
greater punishment than proprietary or other non-violent
crimes18 7 because society considers violent offenses more harm-
ful. When actual violence is extremely unlikely and the offender
suffers from a diminished capacity, the culpability of the of-
fender, the urge for retribution, and the basis for blame are
diminished.
B. DEFINING A VIOLENT OFFENSE: SEARCHING FOR CLARITY
Any attempt to adopt a fact-specific definition of "non-vio-
lent offense" must begin by establishing criteria for determining
what constitutes violence.188 We may recognize violence when
we see it, but providing a specific definition that encompasses
what constitutes violence is problematic. Violence must encom-
pass a notion of both actual and intended physical force. 8 9 A
result- or harm-oriented inquiry would only include violent ac-
187. For example, a "Minor Assault" (including any misdemeanor assault or
felonious assault not covered by § 2A2.2) involving physical contact has a base
offense level of 6. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 2A2.3. A conviction for Property
Damage or Destruction has a base offense level of 4. Id. § 2B1.3. If an offender
had two previous sentences over 60 days (yielding a Criminal History Category
of four), id. § 4A1.1, the property offense might result in probation while the
assault requires incarceration. Id. § 5A. The punishment for burglary also in-
dicates violent crime receives greater punishment. The base offense level for
burglary of a residence is 17. Id. § 2B2.1. The base offense level for burglary of
a non-residence is 12. Id.
188. Violence is a rather ambiguous term. John C. Gunn describes violence
as "an emotive word, and not a particularly satisfactory one - it means several
different things at the same time and sparks off different areas of understand-
ing and interest in different people." JOHN C. GuNN, VIOLENCE 13 (1973). John
Harris argues that "[i~f a man is stabbed to death, we do not doubt that he has
been the victim of a violent assault." JoHN HAmus, VIOLENCE AND RESPONSIBIL-
rry 17 (1980). We recognize this as violence, but what is violent other than
sudden physical force? Harris presents a hypothetical fact pattern of an indi-
vidual sneaking up and pouring acid on a victim. Id. at 15. The acid pourer has
committed an act many would deem violent, but it was slow, painstaking, and
sneaky, rather than sudden force.
189. Violence is defined variously as "exertion of physical force so as to in-
jure or abuse," MRRIAM-WEBSTER INC., WEBsrER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICIONARY 1316 (1990), and "(u]njust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually
with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury." BLAcies LAw DICTION-
ARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). John Harris defines an act of vio-
lence as "occur[ing] when injury or suffering is inflicted upon a person or
persons by an agent who knows (or ought to have known), that his actions
would result in the harm in question." HARus, supra note 188, at 19.
1510 [Vol. 79:1475
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
tions, leaving any real and dangerous threats of violence out of
the definition.' 90 An intent- or purpose-oriented inquiry ignores
the actual likelihood of harm.' 9 ' A combination of the intent to
use or threaten use of force and the actual use or likelihood of
the use of physical force yields the best understanding of a vio-
lent offense.
Courts can apply this understanding of violent offense by
modeling their analysis of the violence of an offense on the
Model Penal Code's definition of criminal attempt.192 Employ-
ing a two-step analysis, the sentencing court should first ex-
amine whether the offender intended to use or threaten the use
of force. Second, the sentencing court should examine whether
the offender's actions constituted a substantial step towards the
use of force. This serves both to establish the likelihood of the
use of force (if none actually occurred) and to corroborate the
offender's intent to use force. A substantial step should demon-
strate a willingness to use force.
190. For example, if the harm or injury to the "victim" is the only criteria, an
individual who shoots at another but misses has not committed a violent act.
191. If the offender actually used force, the question of likelihood is irrele-
vant. Likelihood becomes important when the offender threatens the use of
force. Mr. Chatman's note was likely intended to threaten the use of force, but
any actual use of force was highly unlikely. See supra notes 94-96 and accom-
panying text (explaining the circumstances of Mr. Chatman's robbery).
192. The Model Penal Code defines an individual as guilty of an attempt if:
(1) ... acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for com-
mission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime
if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime,
does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the
belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part;
or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circum-
stances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a
substantial step in the course of the conduct planned to culminate in
his commission of the crime.
(2) .... Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step...
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) [herein-
after MPCI. Sections 1(c) and 2 are pertinent to a determination of violence.
While a mistake of fact, under § 1(a), might prevent injury, it would not reduce
the violence. Examining the intent to use or threat of use of force and requiring
a substantial step towards the use of force will define an offender who fails to
cause harm due to a mistake of fact as violent. Section l(b) collapses into § 1(c)
when the inquiry focuses on the use of force. The offender would have to do
something to cause the use of force. This equates, functionally, with requiring
intent and a substantial step.
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For example, Ms. Poff wrote a letter threatening President
Reagan's life. This clearly satisfies the first part of the analy-
sis-an intent to use or threaten the use of force. Ms. Poff, how-
ever, fails the second part of the analysis-a substantial step
towards the use of force. Ms. Poff would have taken a substan-
tial step towards harming the President if she learned the Presi-
dent's itinerary and made plans to follow him.193 She would
have demonstrated her willingness to go beyond threats. This
does not mean that because Ms. Poff made no preparations, she
should not be punished. Threats of violence merit some level of
criminal liability. A lack of preparation only means that her of-
fense was not violent and, therefore, merits a lesser sentence
when considered in light of her diminished mental capacity.194
C. JUSTIFIED DIsCRETiON IN DETERMINING THE VIOLENCE OF
AN OFFENSE
A fact-specific definition of "non-violent offense" grants dis-
cretion to the sentencing court, which facially seems to contra-
dict the Guideline's purpose of reducing disparity in
sentencing.3195 The Guidelines, after all, attempt to reduce dis-
parity by limiting discretion.19 6 Congress and the Commission,
however, crafted the Guidelines intending to eliminate unwar-
ranted disparity in sentencing.
Congress's mandate to the Commission specifically stated
that dissimilar offenders should continue to receive different
treatment.197 The Commission, in response, provided a series of
193. Ms. Poff apparently made no preparations, as all agreed she posed no
danger of acting on her threats. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
194. See supra notes 76-77 (explaining the source and manifestation of Ms.
Poff's mental illness).
195. See supra notes 25-27 (discussing Congress's concerns in sentencing re-
form and criticism of indeterminate sentencing).
196. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 1A3. The application of the various adjust-
ments and specific offense characteristics defined by the Commission yield a
fairly narrow presumptive range. Compared with the practices of indetermi-
nate sentencing, where the judge could choose from no imprisonment to the
statutory maximum, the presumptive ranges severely limit a judge's discretion.
The Guidelines clearly limit discretion; in fact, some argue they limit discretion
too much. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 43 (arguing the Guidelines ignore the
individuality of the offender); Freed, supra note 6 (criticizing the Guidelines as
an unworkable, unacceptable limitation on discretion).
197. Congress stated that one of the purposes of the Commission was to
"avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparity among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b) (emphasis added).
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departures from the presumptive range in an attempt to allow
sentencing judges the discretion to treat dissimilar offenders dif-
ferently. 198 The issue, therefore, is not whether a fact-specific
inquiry grants discretion to the sentencing court. Instead, the
issue is whether an offender, suffering from a diminished mental
capacity, who posed no actual risk of violence, is materially dis-
similar from one who uses violence in the commission of an of-
fense. The analysis above demonstrates that these offenders are
not similar and, therefore, merit different treatment. Allowing
courts to make a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether an
offender's crime was non-violent is consistent with the Guide-
lines' overarching purpose and best serves the policies underly-
ing the diminished capacity provision.
CONCLUSION
The majority of courts define "non-violent offense" as the op-
posite of "crime of violence." This prevents departure for an of-
fender's diminished mental capacity if the offense involved the
use or threatened use of force. Reliance on the statutory defini-
tion thus treats dissimilar offenders identically. Even if an of-
fender poses no risk of actual violence, the trial court must
impose the same sentence as it would for an offender who actu-
ally used violence.
The text, legislative history, and purposes of the Guidelines,
as well as the purposes of punishment generally, support deter-
mining the violence of an offense, for purposes of the diminished
capacity provision, by examining the specific facts and circum-
stances of the offense and the offender. Individuals suffering
from a diminished mental capacity differ significantly from of-
fenders who commit the same offense without diminished capac-
ity. An offender suffering from a diminished mental capacity
should receive a reduced sentence, provided the offender poses a
minimal danger to society. A fact-specific inquiry best achieves
this end by examining the actual risk of the offender's actions.
The Court should interpret or the Commission should
amend the diminished capacity provision to provide a fact-spe-
cific definition of "non-violent offense." This inquiry should ex-
amine whether the offender intended to use or threaten the use
of force, and whether the offender's actions constituted a sub-
198. The Commission adopted the departure provisions in part because "it is
difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompass the vast range of
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision." U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 1A4(b).
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stantial step towards the use of force. Defining violence in this
manner will improve the fairness of the Guidelines and serve
the Congressional purpose in creating the Commission by ensur-
ing that dissimilar offenders will not receive similar sentencing
under the diminished capacity provision.
